Biological and Cognitive Explanations of Gender

The biological explanation argues that gender development is driven primarily by chromosomes and hormones, not by upbringing or thought. Biological sex is set at conception: an XX pattern typically leads to female development, an XY pattern to male development.

The key switch is the SRY gene (sex-determining region Y), carried on the Y chromosome. In a developing XY embryo the SRY gene triggers the testes to produce testosterone. Testosterone drives the development of male genitalia and is also thought to influence brain development and behaviour, for example being linked to higher levels of aggression.

Element	Role in the biological explanation
Chromosomes	XX (typically female) or XY (typically male) set biological sex at conception
SRY gene	On the Y chromosome; triggers testosterone production
Testosterone	Drives male genital development; thought to affect brain and behaviour
Prenatal exposure	Hormone levels in the womb are thought to shape later gender-related behaviour

The core claim of the biological explanation is that gender-related behaviour is shaped by prenatal exposure to hormones such as testosterone, well before any social influence begins.

Two lines of evidence are commonly used to support the biological account: a human case study and controlled animal experiments.

The David Reimer case is the most cited human example. After a circumcision accident destroyed his penis as a baby, David was surgically reassigned and raised as a girl ("Brenda"), on the advice that gender identity was learned. Despite being socialised as female throughout childhood, he never adopted a female identity, felt he was male, and later reverted to living as a man. This is used to argue that biology strongly influences gender identity, and that socialisation alone cannot override it.

Controlled animal studies provide experimental support. Research in the tradition of Young et al. manipulated prenatal hormone levels in animals and found this altered their later gendered behaviour, for example making females display more male-typical mounting behaviour. Because hormone levels were directly manipulated, these studies suggest a causal role for prenatal hormones in gender-related behaviour.

A case study cannot be manipulated experimentally, so David Reimer alone cannot prove causation. Its value is that it converges with the animal experiments, which can establish cause and effect but raise the problem of generalising from animals to humans.

Cognitive explanations shift the focus from biology to the child's own thinking. Kohlberg argued that a child's understanding of gender develops in fixed stages as their general cognitive maturity increases. The child is an active thinker who must reach a certain level of understanding before gender behaviour becomes important to them.

Kohlberg proposed three stages that follow in order:

Stage	Approx. age	What the child now understands
Gender identity	2–3 years	Can correctly label their own and others' sex, but does not realise it is fixed
Gender stability	4 years	Own gender stays the same over time, but may think it changes with appearance
Gender constancy	6–7 years	Gender is fixed across time and situation, whatever the outward appearance

At the gender identity stage a child can say "I am a boy" or "she is a girl" but has no sense that this is permanent. At gender stability the child grasps that they will stay the same gender as they grow up, but can still be fooled by surface changes, thinking a man who wears a dress becomes a woman, or getting confused about others.

The turning point is gender constancy. Only once a child understands gender is consistent across time and situations do they begin to actively seek out same-gender role models and imitate their behaviour.

Martin and Halverson (1981) agreed gender development is cognitive but argued Kohlberg placed the key change too late. In their theory, children begin actively learning about gender as soon as they have a basic gender identity at around 2–3 years — earlier than Kohlberg's constancy stage.

Once a child can label themselves as a boy or a girl, they start building gender schemas: organised clusters of beliefs and expectations about what each gender does, wears and likes. These schemas then act as a filter that directs attention and memory:

• Children pay more attention to information that fits their own gender's schema (the in-group).
• They remember in-group-consistent information in greater detail.
• They tend to ignore or misremember information that is inconsistent with a gender schema.

This explains why young children hold such rigid, stereotyped views of gender: they actively seek out schema-consistent information and screen out anything that contradicts it.

Kohlberg says children need gender constancy (~6–7 years) before gender learning really begins. Gender schema theory says they only need basic gender identity (~2–3 years), so gender learning starts much earlier. This earlier timing is the central difference between the two theories.

Both theories are cognitive-developmental: they explain gender through the child's growing understanding rather than through hormones or reinforcement. The crucial difference is when active gender learning is thought to begin.

Feature	Kohlberg's theory	Gender schema theory (Martin & Halverson)
Type of explanation	Cognitive-developmental (stages)	Cognitive (schema formation)
Trigger for gender learning	Gender constancy (~6–7 years)	Basic gender identity (~2–3 years)
Main mechanism	Imitating same-gender role models	Schemas directing attention and memory
Explains rigid stereotypes?	Less well — learning starts late	Yes — schemas filter and distort information

The key point for an exam answer is that gender schema theory pushes the onset of gender learning earlier than Kohlberg. A child does not have to understand that gender is permanent before they start organising the world into "for boys" and "for girls" — they only need to know which group they belong to.

A strong comparison names the timing difference explicitly: schemas form from basic gender identity onwards, whereas Kohlberg requires the later achievement of gender constancy.

Kohlberg's theory has supporting evidence. Slaby and Frey found that children who had reached gender constancy paid more attention to same-sex models on screen, which supports Kohlberg's claim that constancy drives the imitation of same-gender role models. However, the theory may underestimate young children's gender knowledge: children show clear gendered toy and activity preferences well before they reach constancy, which Kohlberg struggles to explain but gender schema theory accounts for neatly.

Gender schema theory also has supporting evidence. Martin and Halverson found that children under six misremembered photographs that were inconsistent with gender stereotypes, for example recalling a picture of a male nurse as a doctor. This memory distortion is exactly what schema theory predicts, supporting the idea that schemas actively shape what children notice and remember.

Cognitive theories neglect biology and social factors. Both Kohlberg and schema theory focus almost entirely on the child's own thinking and downplay the role of hormones (the biological explanation) and of reinforcement and media (social learning theory). Because gender development almost certainly involves all of these, an interactionist account that combines cognitive, biological and social factors is likely to be more complete than any single approach.

The biological explanation is well supported but risks determinism. The David Reimer case and controlled hormone studies give the biological account real evidential strength. However, it risks biological determinism — treating gender as fixed by chromosomes and hormones — and struggles to explain the wide cultural variation in gender roles, which points to a role for learning and culture that biology alone cannot capture.

Aim for depth over breadth in the exam: two or three fully developed evaluation points, each stating the point, the evidence, and what it means for the theory, will usually score better than a list of undeveloped criticisms.

1. Getting Kohlberg's three stages out of order

The fixed sequence is gender identity → gender stability → gender constancy. Reversing stability and constancy, or leaving out identity, loses easy marks. Anchor them to the ages: identity ~2–3, stability ~4, constancy ~6–7.

2. Muddling gender stability with gender constancy

Stability is about time only (I will stay the same gender as I grow up). Constancy is about time AND situation (my gender does not change even if I change my hair, clothes or activity). Constancy is the later, more complete understanding.

3. Saying gender schema theory requires gender constancy

Gender schema theory only needs a basic gender identity (~2–3 years) for schemas to start forming — not constancy. This is why schema theory places gender learning earlier than Kohlberg. Writing that schemas need constancy reverses the whole point of the comparison.

4. Treating biological and cognitive explanations as mutually exclusive

Biological and cognitive explanations are complementary, not rival answers to the same question. One describes the physical basis of sex and gendered behaviour (chromosomes, hormones); the other describes how a child comes to understand gender. A good answer notes that an interactionist view combines them rather than picking one.

5. Describing evidence without using it to evaluate

Naming Slaby and Frey or the male-nurse study is only AO1 if you stop there. To gain AO3 marks you must state what the evidence shows about the theory — that it supports the constancy sequence, or that it demonstrates schema-driven memory distortion.